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Abstract
This paper studies supply-side health interventions, which increased the monetary incentives and number of health
professionals in the Deep South provinces of Thailand, and provides evidence on the effectiveness of provision of
primary care providers on the health care utilization of the community. We use a difference-in-differences approach to
estimate effects of this policy on child health by evaluating the probability of immunizations in the policy affected
areas using two rounds of the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS). We find that after the policy
implementation, there is a decrease in immunizations that are given to children within 2 months and 1 year of their
date of birth between 6.8 to 17.9 percentage points, controlling for cohort specific time-invariant unobservables.
However, we note an increase in BCG vaccinations that are administered at the time of birth. Event studies suggest no
presence of pre-trends before the policy implementation. We also observe heterogeneity of effects along the
dimensions of residence, ethnicity, and education of the caretaker with children belonging to rural areas, non-Thai
ethnicity, and uneducated caretakers experiencing stronger effects. We investigate the quality of services as a
mechanism to explain these findings using Thai Health and Welfare Surveys (HWS) and find a shift from small
government facilities to large government facilities for in-patient services, indicating a decrease in demand due to lower
quality.
Citation: Pallavi Panda and Pasita Chaijaroen, (2020) ''Do rural health worker incentive schemes work? Evidence from Thailand'', Economics
Bulletin, Volume 40, Issue 2, pages 1583-1595
Contact: Pallavi Panda - panda@geneseo.edu, Pasita Chaijaroen - pasita.c@vistec.ac.th.
Submitted: December 21, 2019.   Published: June 07, 2020.
 
   
1. Introduction 
Historically, Thailand suffers from a lack of health workers, especially in the public system 
and rural areas. In 2003 and 2004, the doctor to population ratio in Thailand was 0.3 doctors 
per 1,000 population compared to the 0.4 and 2.9 in other Southeast Asian countries and 
Europe, respectively (Thinakorn and Pagaiya 2009). Starting in 2004, political unrests became 
increasingly intense in the country’s three southern-most provinces: Yala, Pattani, and 
Narathiwat. To recruit and retain health workers in the area, the government announced an 
extra hardship monetary allowance and a special medical student recruitment program in May 
2005. The extra hardship allowance for the Deep South was considerably large relative to the 
hardship allowance already in place and those elsewhere in the country. Prior to this policy, 
the hardship allowance for doctors and dentists in extremely remote areas was 20,000 baht per 
month, while the hardship allowances in other remote areas  and in non-remote rural areas were 
10,000 and 2,000 baht per month, respectively.1 The new policy added an extra 10,000 baht 
per month to the hardship allowance for doctors and dentists in the Deep South and an extra 
2,800 baht per month for some non-remote rural areas. Nurses and pharmacists also received 
the extra hardship allowance, though in smaller amounts. 
In addition to the extra hardship allowance, the government started a local recruitment program 
in which 30 additional slots in a nearby medical school were granted to local high school 
students. These students are required to return and serve their area after graduation. This 
recruitment program was planned for 2005-2013, and the first batch of students graduated in 
March 2011. Later in 2007, the government also initiated a similar recruitment program for 
nurses in which 3,000 local students were sent to nursing schools all over the country. These 
students also graduated and started working in the area in 2011. Given that these policies were 
implemented due to political unrest rather than lack of doctors and worse health outcomes in 
the area per se, we use this natural experiment to study the impact of an increase in supply of 
doctors and nurses in the affected areas.2 
This paper studies these supply-side health interventions and provides evidence on the 
effectiveness of provision of primary care providers on healthcare utilization of the community. 
We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to estimate effects of this policy on child 
health by looking at the probability of immunizations and anthropometric outcomes in the 
policy affected areas. Our main source of data is two rounds of the Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Surveys (MICS). Since this is not a panel dataset, we develop household-cohorts to control for 
cohort specific time-invariant unobservables. Our key assumption for identification is that this 
policy change was driven by political motivations at the province level and hence was 
exogenous to household cohort health-related behaviors. We find no evidence of pre-trends in 
our data and a large change once the policy is in effect. We find that after the policy 
implementation, there is a decrease in immunizations that are given to children within 2 months 
and 1 year of their date of birth. On the other hand, we record an increase in BCG 
immunization, which is given at the time of the birth. 
 
1  In this period, hospitals were initially categorized into three hardship levels based only on distance and travel time to 
nearest towns and cities. For this reason, hospitals in the deep south fell into all hardship levels. The categorization gradually 
changed every year. By 2008, all district hospitals in the deep south fell under the extreme hardship (Hardship II) category. 
2 There is a marked increase in the number of nurses available per thousand population and increasing trend in number of the 
doctors in the treatment areas after 2011 in our data (see Figure 1). Before the policy implementation, we check the 
distribution of doctors per 1000 population ratio and see that the treated areas are at the mode of the distribution in both 2003 
and 2004. We also do not observe any statistically significant differences in vaccinations administered after 2 months of 
birth between treated and control provinces, before the treatment was implemented.  
We then explore channels through which our results are realized, and we present the quality of 
care as the main driver. Filmer et al. (2000) find mixed evidence in the literature looking at the 
effect of access to hospitals, doctors, public sector clinics, health centers, and rural health 
workers on health status. They bring out two key intertwining perspectives to understand the 
effectiveness (or the lack of it) of health policy— incentives and choices. While the government 
focuses on quantity or delivery of services, the quality of services could be lacking leading to 
health services having no impact on health. Just the presence of healthcare facilities or 
improvement in the number of doctors may not bring significant differences in health outcomes 
as is documented in different country settings (Frankenberg 1995; Rosenzweig and Schultz 
1982). There is also a rich health economics literature that documents the importance of quality 
on health outcomes. Björkman and Svensson (2009) show that the community monitoring of 
the health care provider lead to an improvement in child health and increase in healthcare 
utilization. Barber, Gertler and Harimurti (2007) demonstrate that private nurses offer below-
average care and private physicians provide high quality care in Indonesia. Das et al. (2008b) 
find that the quality of care in low-income countries as measured by what doctors know is very 
low, and that the problem of low competence is compounded by low effort. The low quality of 
services, despite recruitment of doctors and nurses is documented in various developing 
countries due to low or no accountability of physicians or nurses leading to long wait times, 
absence of doctors, and limited consultation hours (Lewis et al. 1996; The World Bank 1994). 
When the quality of services is low, it acts as a disincentive for individuals to use those services 
and instead individuals bypass them for better services elsewhere, known in the literature as 
the bypassing hypothesis. Consistent with the bypassing hypothesis, we find evidence of a shift 
from small government facilities to large government facilities, conditioning on needing 
medical services.  
Our paper fits in well in a literature on preventive care interventions. Many supply-side health 
interventions in developing countries are focused on primary health care which is used by the 
rural and poor population. Review of the literature suggests that the effectiveness of the 
intervention may vary by country and local characteristics. Many studies assess effects of 
access to services on child or infant mortality in various countries, and find mixed evidence  
(Lavy et al. 1996; Pitt et al. 1993; Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982). In this literature, it can be 
hard to disentangle the demand and supply sides of effects given the strong interrelationship 
between the two. A higher demand for health care leads to higher provision of health care 
facilities and a higher demand is observed when good quality healthcare is provided. Our paper 
complements this literature and offers an opportunity to partially disentangle the demand and 
supply effects. Thailand rolled out a universal health insurance coverage in 2001 which takes 
into account incomes, prices, and demand for specific services. Gruber et al. (2014) find that 
the increased funding to hospitals and reduced copays due to this program led to a significant 
increase in healthcare utilization and a fall in infant mortality. Given the universal health 
coverage in Thailand, everyone is guaranteed a basic access to health care, so demand-side 
variations are mostly driven by preferences for quality, not by affordability of health care. In 
the context of Thailand, a number of papers in economics and public health have examined 
effects of rural doctor incentives and a rural doctor recruitment program on rural doctor 
retention (Pagaiya et al. 2015; Techakehakij and Arora 2017). Our paper also completes the 
picture in this literature by showing how these incentive structures translate into changes in 
healthcare utilization and health outcomes in the population. 
2. Data 
We first present evidence that the policy was successful in increasing the number of doctors 
and nurses in the treatment areas. This is presented in Figure 1 and the data is collected from 
the Reports on Public Health Resource by Ministry of Public Health, Thailand. We see a clear 
jump in the number of nurses available per thousand population in the treatment areas after 
2011 when the new graduates started working. There is also an increasing trend in the number 
of doctors in the treated areas since 2005, however not as stark as the increase in number of 
nurses. These two policies combined significantly increased health workers in the area at all 
facility levels; however, rural clinics were probably still not regularly staffed with doctors and 
many of the procedures were being performed by nurses. This could lead to lower quality of 
services provided in these facilities.   
Figure 1: Nurse and Doctor Population in Thailand 
  
Note: The graphs show the trends in nurses and doctors per thousand population in the treated and control areas overtime.  
Data Source: Reports on Public Health Resource, Ministry of Public Health, Thailand 
 
We use two repeated cross-sectional health surveys in this paper: The Multiple Indicator 
Cluster Surveys (MICS) and the Thai Health and Welfare Surveys (HWS). The MICS were 
designed to collect information on children and women around the world. In this paper, we 
focus on immunization and anthropometric outcomes from the children module in the 2005-06 
and the 2016 14-province datasets. The 2005-6 wave covers all provinces in Thailand while 
the 2016 wave only contains 14 selected provinces from all areas of the country. The children 
module in both waves covers children age between 0–5 years. Given the nature of the surveys 
and that the survey is carried out once in a decade, most treatment data come from the 2016 
MICS survey while most pre-treatment data comes from the MICS 2005-06 survey. In addition 
to the MICS, we also tap on the HWS for healthcare utilization outcomes. The HWS is a 
national-representative cross-sectional survey covering several aspects of public health. In this 
paper, we use the data from 2001, 2003, 2009, 2011, and 2013. 
We analyze if the policies affected healthcare utilization by focusing on vaccinations children 
received. The vaccination data in the MICS mostly come from each child’s vaccination card. 
To make the data consistent between the two waves, we exclude children without the 
vaccination cards.3 Our main results focus on five vaccinations: Bacillus Calmette-Guern 
(BCG) for tuberculosis; the first oral polio vaccine (OPV1); the first vaccine for diphtheria, 
tetanus toxoids and pertussis (DTP1); the first hepatitis B vaccine (H1); and the first vaccine 
against measles, mumps and rubella (MMR1).  For all vaccinations except the BCG, our 
outcome for each vaccination is a dummy indicator that is equal to one if a child has got that 
vaccine. Children who are too young and not yet eligible for the vaccine are excluded. The 
BCG is given at birth, and almost every child got the BCG. For this reason, we instead use a 
dummy variable for whether a child got it on time (within 3 days of birth). The OPV1, DTP1, 
 
3 Around 86% of all children got a vaccination card. We tested for selection based on the vaccination card availability and 
found that children in the treated area were less likely to have the vaccination card after the policies were implemented. By 
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and H1 are administered to the child after 2 months of birth and the MMR is administered to 
the child from 9 months to 1 year of birth. We also look at some standard anthropometric 
measures like HAZ and WAZ scores to look at malnutrition and health outcomes for 
children.4  
Table I: Summary Statistics of Key Variables from the 2005-2006 MICS Data 
Variable 
Treated Group Control Group 
p-value Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Vaccinations        
BCG 1.000 0.000 508 0.993 0.082 1,177 0.002 
BCG (on time) 0.642 0.480 508 0.861 0.346 1,177 0.024 
OPV1 0.986 0.119 489 0.990 0.098 1,135 0.006 
DTP1 0.986 0.119 489 0.990 0.098 1,135 0.006 
H1 0.994 0.078 489 0.996 0.066 1,135 0.004 
MMR1 0.948 0.222 423 0.965 0.183 980 0.012 
Anthropometry        
Weight 11.585 3.848 683 12.155 4.057 1,339 0.184 
WAZ -0.204 1.635 677 0.053 1.567 1,335 0.076 
Height 84.813 14.535 680 85.911 14.473 1,336 0.684 
HAZ -1.000 1.753 680 -0.696 1.369 1,336 0.077 
Child characteristics        
Female 0.486 0.500 689 0.492 0.500 1,395 0.023 
Age 2.007 1.421 688 1.984 1.395 1,390 0.066 
Household’s and caretaker’s characteristics      
Rural 0.579 0.494 689 0.518 0.500 1,395 0.023 
Low income 0.936 0.245 689 0.871 0.335 1,394 0.013 
Thai ethnicity 0.226 0.419 689 0.860 0.347 1,395 0.018 
Caretaker's age 31.792 7.984 689 33.654 10.706 1,395 0.418 
Female caretaker 0.997 0.054 689 0.988 0.110 1,395 0.004 
Caretaker > elementary 
educ 0.091 0.288 689 0.153 0.361 1,395 0.015 
Notes: p-values are from two-sample t-tests for differences in means. 
Table I contains summary statistics of key variables from the 2005-2006 MICS data and shows 
that our treated group differed from others in almost every dimension prior to the policy 
changes. These differences, however, do not pose serious threats to our identification as pre-
treatment trends in outcomes are similar among the two groups (shown in Appendix A1). In 
our sample, most children get the required vaccinations. In both the treated and control groups, 
we do not find severe cases of stunting or wasting. Children seem to be better nourished in the 
control group than the treated, with mean WAZ being 0.05 and mean HAZ being -0.7. About 
half of our sample is female children with an average age of about 2 years. The treated group 
is more rural, poor, and less educated. The caretaker is overwhelmingly female and above 30 
in the sample. The treated region also has less people of Thai ethnicity than the control group. 
 
4 Height-for-Age Z Score (HAZ) is the number of standard deviations of the actual height of a child from the median height 
of the children of his/her age as determined from the standard sample. Weight-for-Height Z Score (WAZ) is the number of 
standard deviations of the actual weight of a child from the median weight of the children of his/her height as determined 
from the standard sample. 
3. Methodology 
We explore effects of the incentive programs using an event study analysis and a Difference-
in-Difference (DiD) approach. The treated group includes children living in the Deep South: 
the provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwas. The control group consists of children in the 
rest of the 14 provinces. The time period under both approaches is defined based on exposure 
to the policies and hence varies with outcomes. The effects of the policy are staggered. First, 
during 2005–2010, only the extra hardship allowance was effectively in place because the 
newly recruited medical and nursing students were still in training. The first batch of the 
students graduated in March 2011 and started working in April–May 2011, so we see the 
cumulative effects of both the policies after the first quarter of 2011. Therefore, we divide the 
DiD treated period into two sub-periods: 2006 to the first quarter of 2011, and the second 
quarter of 2011 onward to accurately measure the impact of the policies. Lagarde et al. (2013) 
performed a discrete choice experiment on young doctors in Thailand and found that the 
doctors preferred an easy access to specialty training over a low to moderate hardship 
allowance. However, doctors with rural background were more responsive to the financial 
incentives than other doctors. Given the staggered implementation of different incentives and 
previous literature documenting differential impact of incentives on attracting health personnel 
(Lagarde et al. 2013), the treatment indicator is devised to capture these differential effects. 
Let ��� be the outcome of interest for child i belonging to household-cohort c at time t. Then, 
the main DiD estimating equation can be written as  
��� =  + � �� � + ∑ ��� �� + �� �� � ∗ �� �� �=�,�� + ′ ��� + �� + � + ���� , (1) 
where � �� � is a dummy indicator equal to 1 if a child i lives in the treated province, p. �� ��  and �� ��� are dummy indicators for the two treated periods. ��� is a vector of 
individual and household control covariates like caretaker’s age, caretaker’s education, gender 
of the child, and birth order. ��  and �  are household-cohort and time fixed effects, respectively. 
The household cohorts are sets of households belonging to particular province, ethnicity, and 
income levels.5 The error term ���� may be correlated within provinces, so we use province-
clustered standard errors in all of our estimation. 
By using household cohorts, we are controlling for household cohort specific time invariant 
characteristics. In essence, we are creating a pseudo panel which tracks household belonging 
to a particular province, Thai ethnicity, and wealth strata. The MICS survey has details on the 
assets of the household and not the income. Given the asset details and using principal 
component analysis, we create a wealth indicator and group households into three broad 
categories – low, middle, and high income – which we then use to create household cohorts. 
Since asset creation takes time and there is in general low mobility between wealth strata, we 
can observe households in a province with particular ethnicity and wealth levels to display 
similar unobserved behavior overtime. By creating these cohorts, we are better able to control 
for these time invariant unobservables since households belonging to these cohorts are 
expected to display similar time invariant characteristics. However, it should be kept in mind 
that since we are not observing the same caretaker over two rounds of survey, this analysis is 
unable to control for family level time invariant unobservable like child rearing ability of the 
caretaker. 
 
5 These three variables are significant in all the OLS specifications, which makes us choose these three to create household 
cohorts. We also check for different specifications of cohorts including different characteristics and do not find a difference 
in the main results. These results are presented in Appendix A4. 
Next, in section 6, we also explore heterogeneity in our regression results. We estimate 
equation (1) by subsamples and report  ̂��. We also report the p-value for �̂�� from a pooled 
regression following equation (2) to illustrate if a difference between the two subsamples is statistically 
significant. Let ���� be a dummy variable, such as a child’s sex, that separates the sample into 
the subsamples, then the pooled regression equation takes the following form: 
��� =  + � �� � + � � �� � ∗ ���� + ∑ ( ��� �� + �� �� � ∗ �� �� + ���� �� ∗�=�,������ + ��� �� � ∗ �� �� ∗ ����) + � ���� + ′ ��� +  �� + � + ���� .   (2) 
4. Event Study 
 
Figure 2: Event Study Graphs for the Treated Provinces 
 
Note: The graphs show the trends in BCG, DTP1, H1, OPV1, and MMR vaccines before and after the treatment. For each time period, we 
show a point estimate for the effect as well as a 95% confidence interval constructed from province-clustered standard error. The F-statistics 
for pre and post periods are noted below each graph. 
 
We create an event-study graph for the treated provinces to show the effect of the policy on 
vaccinations.6 Using the same notation as in (1) and (2), the estimating equation for the event 
study analysis can be written as ��� =  + ∑ �−�= − �� � ∗ � = � + ∑ ��= �� � ∗ � = � + ′ ��� + �� + � +���� ,             (3) 
where � is an index for the years before and after the treatment became effective.  � is equal to 
zero in the period that the policy became effective, is negative for the periods before that, and 
is positive for the periods after. We omit the period immediately preceding the effective period 
to eliminate any anticipatory effects that may be present due to the informal announcement of 
the policy before it is implemented. Using this study, we could test for the joint significance of 
pre-treatment years using the F-statistic.  
 
The results are presented in Figure 2. After controlling for household cohorts and time fixed 
effects, we find that there are no noticeable trends in the pre-treatment period for vaccines. 
Consequently, F-test rejects the null hypothesis of joint significance of pre-treatment year 
effects.  The vaccination rates for vaccinations given at 2 months from date of birth (DTP1, 
H1, OPV1) and after 1 year from the date of birth (MMR) fall after the implementation of the 
policy. However, we observe a marked increase in BCG vaccinations after the treatment. We 
also do an event study for other health care outcomes; however, we cannot rule out the presence 
of pre-trends in the variable of interest especially in HAZ scores. These graphs are presented 
in Appendix A2. 
5. Results 
The regression results based on equation (1) affirm the findings from the event study analysis—
children were less likely to receive most vaccinations after the policy changes. In Table II, 
Columns (1)-(3), we gauge the effect of the treatment on vaccinations taken after 2 months of 
birth date and find a significant decrease in DTP1, OPV1, and H1 vaccinations, not controlling 
for household cohorts. In Table II, (4)-(7), we add household cohorts as additional controls and 
find a larger decrease in vaccination rates. The combined effect of the policies leads to a 
decrease in children getting the DTP1 vaccine by 8.4 percentage points, OPV1 vaccine by 7.5 
percentage points, and H1 vaccine by 6.8 percentage points as seen in Table II columns (4), 
(5), and (6) respectively. The effect is even greater for MMR vaccine, which is given to the 
child at the age of 1 year. In Table II (7), we observe a decrease in probability of receiving 
MMR vaccine by 17.9 percentage points. The results are consistent across different 
specifications.7 
We also look at immunizations received at birth, specifically the BCG vaccination. We find an 
increase in the BCG vaccination received on time across specifications after the policy is in 
effect. The onset of extra hardship monetary allowance immediately led to an increase in BCG 
vaccination rates, and the further influx of new health worker graduates in 2011 led to another 
round of increase in the BCG vaccinations. Columns (1) and (2) in Table III do not control for 
household-cohorts and find an increase in the vaccination rates by 0.23–0.25 percentage points 
after the first period and another increase by 0.2 percentage points after the second treatment 
in 2011. The results hold as we control for household-cohorts in specification (3) and (4) in 
Table III. The vaccination results overall point to the importance of the timing of the 
vaccination delivery. If the vaccination is delivered at birth, like the BCG, we see that the 
 
6 Additionally, we also test the parallel trend assumption embedded in a DiD analysis to find if the evidence is causal. These 
graphs are presented in Appendix A1. 
7 The full set of results for all the vaccinations are presented in Appendix A3 for the interested reader. 
policy is effective in increasing healthcare utilization. However, if the vaccinations are 
provided later on in a child’s life, we see a decrease in utilization of the healthcare services. 
Table II: After- Birth Vaccinations 
 All Sample 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent 
Variable 
DTP1 OPV1 H1 DTP1 OPV1 H1 MMR 
Treat 1 
0.00353 0.00312 0.000390 -0.0171 -0.0203 -0.0206* -0.0964 
(0.945) (0.953) (0.964) (0.758) (0.719) (0.051) (0.209) 
Treat 2 
-0.0675*** -0.0488*** -0.0461*** -0.0840*** -0.0748*** -0.0682*** -0.179*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Household 
Cohort FE 
NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Number of 
provinces 
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Observations 8589 8616 8616 8589 8616 8616 7843 
Note: p-values in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
Table III: At-Birth Vaccinations 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
Dependent Variable BCG BCG BCG BCG 
Treat 1 
0.234** 0.249*** 0.277*** 0.285*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Treat 2 
0.197*** 0.213*** 0.231** 0.237** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Explanatory Variables YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES NO NO 
Household Cohort FE NO NO YES YES 
Control provinces All All but South All All but South 
Observations 8179 6901 8179 6901 
Note: p-values in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
We also explore the policy’s second order effects on child health via the WAZ and HAZ scores. 
We do not find any statistically significant second order effect on child’s weight and wasting. 
We do find some effect on child’s HAZ scores, but pre-trends in these specifications cannot be 
eliminated and therefore should be interpreted cautiously. We present these results in Appendix 
A2. We also run various specifications of the estimation models as robustness checks and our 
results remain qualitatively similar to our main estimations. Our results are robust to an 
alternative definition of control units. We also test for the validity of the results if we do not 
include other southern provinces in our control units to account for spillover effects. We also 
check at the district level if the treatment is demand driven or endogenous and do not find any 
evidence.8 
6. Heterogeneity and Channels 
We find significant differences in vaccination rates for children being in the rural area, 
caretaker being educated, and being of Thai ethnicity.  Table IV panel (A) shows stronger 
effects in rural areas than in urban areas, with rural population having a greater decrease in 
vaccinations like OPV1, H1, and MMR. OPV1 vaccination rate falls by around 8.7 percentage 
points for rural children while children in urban areas see a decrease of about 3.9 percentage 
points.  Similarly, the rural population is 20.6 percentage points less likely to receive MMR 
while the effect on the urban population is only 8.7 percentage points. The combined effects of 
the policies lead to a higher decrease in DTP1, OPV1, and H1 vaccinations in non-Thai 
population by 3.4–5.5 percentage points vis-à-vis the Thai population as shown in Table IV 
panel (C). The non-Thai population also have a significantly higher probability of receiving 
the BCG vaccination on time. Given that the treatment region has a higher proportion of non-
Thai population, we see more concentrated effects for this population. Heterogeneity by 
education are presented in Table IV panel (D). A child with a caretaker who is not educated 
would be less likely than the control group to receive the DTP1, H1, and OPV1 vaccinations 
by 12.5 percentage points, 11.1 percentage points, and 8.9 percentage points respectively. 
These effects are larger in magnitude than those for the educated subsample by 3–7.8 
percentage points. 
We also check for differences along the dimensions of income and gender of the child in Table 
IV panels (B) and (E). We do not find significant differences in vaccination rates along these 
dimensions. This could be partly explained by the prevalence of universal health insurance in 
Thailand such that any demand side mechanisms for health that may originate out of wealth of 
a family are taken care of. Thailand does not also display any son preference that is typical of 
some other Asian countries like India and China (Panda 2019; Jayachandran and Pande 2017; 
Das Gupta et al. 2003). These results suggest that the vaccination that is given along with the 
delivery of child like the BCG benefits from the presence of doctors and nurses in the area, and 
this positive effect is generally stronger in low socioeconomic status (SES) groups. However, 
we see evidence of a larger decrease in demand for vaccinations that are given 2 months after 
birth in the low SES population relative to those with higher SES. 
In terms of policy implementation, we see a higher concentration of nurses in the rural areas 
while a higher concentration of doctors in the urban areas. The observed results are in line with 
the literature pointing towards low quality of services leading to mixed outcomes (Das et al. 
2008; Filmer et al. 2000). Due to lower quality, people can decrease their demand for health 
care and/or substitute public facilities with private facilities providing higher quality care 
(Filmer et al. 2000). To explore this quality mechanism, we use the HWS Dataset to look at 
healthcare utilization in the three Deep South provinces. Table V presents these results. An 
indicator of quality of public facility, for which data is available in the HWS dataset, is 
preventive care. We observe evidence of a decline in the demand for preventive care by 3.1 
percentage points in the affected provinces, possibly due to the lower quality of services in 
Table V (1). Table V (2) shows that the probability of households going for medical checkups 
decreased by 2.32 percentage points after the policy is in effect. Overall, people seek less care.  
 
8 Results available on request. 
Table IV: Heterogeneity Analysis  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 


























 N 3721 3736 3736 3404 3514 
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 N 3569 3582 3582 3254 3445 


























 N 4405 4415 4201 4027 4207 
 p-value 0.8395 0.6291 0.85 0.8717 0.2118 
Note: All the columns represent different regressions on various vaccinations in the second treated period. The 
first and third numbers in each cell are ̂ ��from (1) estimated using two subsamples. Their respective p-values 
are reported in the parentheses. The p-values row states the p-value for �̂�� from (2) using the pooled sample. 
Stars denote statistical significance in the subsample estimates (*** at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level). 
 
We also observe a decrease in utilization of health services at small government facilities in 
the Deep South, conditioning on getting sick. We do not find any evidence of people falling 
sick less often in the sample, ruling out selection in Table V (3). For the people who do fall 
sick, there is a decrease in utilization of OPD and IPD services in the small government 
facilities by 9.9 percentage points and 31.3 percentage points respectively as shown in Table 
V (4) and (5). At the same time, Table V (6) shows there is an increase in IPD services sought 
at big government hospitals by around 28.4 percentage points. This implies that people might 
be bypassing the “lower” quality facilities to higher level ones. It is also possible that the policy 
might be effective at improving larger facilities, but not smaller ones. 
Table V: Channels  
 Preventive Care Utilization  


















-0.0314** -0.0232** -0.0268 -0.0986** -0.313** 0.284** 
(0.036) (0.048) (0.288) (0.028) (0.017) (0.029) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Wave FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 














Observations 10289 10289 10289 1918 590 590 
Note: Explanatory variables include education level of the household, type of health insurance, age, gender, if the person is 
employed, ownership of the house, and material of the household. p-values are reported in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
The only evidence of positive health outcome is increase in on-time BCG vaccinations after 
the treatment. The data provides two probable explanations. First, in Figure 3 we see an 
increase in live births at hospitals in the post treatment years. Since the BCG vaccination is 
given at birth, we see an increase in on-time delivery of the vaccination as people are already 
in the hospital for the delivery. Second, in Thailand, deliveries are usually done at hospitals 
while rural clinics are responsible for pre and postnatal care. We observe an increase in demand 
for delivery and health service utilization in the large government hospitals as they are 
perceived to be of superior quality than the rural clinics. This also explains the large 
concentrated decrease in utilization for preventive care services in the rural areas. 
 
Figure 3: Percent Livebirths in Hospitals in Thailand 
 
  
Note: Increase in births in hospitals after the policy implementation in the treated and control units. 










2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008









2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
% Livebirths in All Hospitals
Treated Control
7. Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence on the effectiveness of a large scale supply side health 
intervention in Thailand. Using two different household level datasets, we find a decrease in 
healthcare utilization for preventive care vaccinations that are administered after 2 months and 
1 year of birth to the child. At the same time, we observe an increase in on time BCG 
vaccinations for children. We also observe heterogeneity in the population with more 
concentrated effects on the rural, uneducated, and non-Thai sections of the population. We 
explore the channels through which the results are manifested. We provide quality of health 
care delivery as a mechanism for the reduced utilization in small rural healthcare facilities. This 
paper emphasizes the need to evaluate the quality of healthcare provision especially for 
preventive care services in the rural areas and adds to the rich literature on the persistent links 
between quality, quantity, and impact of health policy.  
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